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Abstract
We model non-drastic technological innovation in a duopoly model with differentiated products. We derive profit
functions for both firms which depend on only one variable, the technological gap. As our model derives product
demands directly from agent utility we are able to fully describe the welfare effects of innovation. We show that the
welfare improvements from innovation come not only as firms accrue higher profits, by charging consumers higher
prices, but also as consumers enjoy higher quality products.
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1 Introduction
The innovation and intellectual property rights literature is both vast and expansive. The
quality ladder model of sequential cumulative innovation is now well known. In this model
innovation forms a discrete sequence of steps along a ladder with lower rungs representing
lower quality (technology) and higher rungs representing superior quality. As the quality of
the product reaches the top rung through innovation the innovating firm garners monopoly
profits if the innovation was of a sufficient magnitude to be patentable. This issue of
breadth has been a main focus of the literature.1 If the breadth requirement is narrow
this could encourage rapid innovation in small steps, but the result could be many similar
products. If the breadth requirement is too wide, then innovation may occur slowly (See
Scotchmer (2004) for a summary). While the questions of when a firm should patent and
when does an innovation infringe on a previous patent versus deserve a new patent are very
important topics, these questions are not the focus of this research.
Our focus is on non-drastic innovation. Drastic innovation is what is commonly assumed
in the traditional quality ladder models whereby the innovating firm enjoys monopoly prof-
its. Non-drastic innovation, on the other hand, is characterized by continued competition
after innovation as would occur in markets with product differentiation. Kamien and Tau-
man (1986) explore drastic and non-drastic innovation and the incentives to offer a license
in exchange for royalties or a fixed fee. Their model contains no product differentiation
with innovations being cost improvements. This is also the approach of Marjit (1990) and
Wang (1998) who examine the licensing problem in a Cournot framework rather than the
Stackelburg framework of Kamien and Tauman (1986). Wang (2002) extends the analysis
to differentiated products in the Cournot framework. A drawback to all of these is that
the role of the demand side of the economy is fairly neglected. We contend that in the case
of non-drastic innovation with product differentiation, this is a major flaw. Muto (1993)
derives demand for differentiated products that compete in a Bertrand style framework
however innovation is modeled as cost reducing and is owned by an external patentee.
This paper extends the literature by advancing a model of sequential non-drastic inno-
vation in the presence of differentiated products. Grossman and Helpman (1991) examine
this type of differentiated innovation whereby each firm’s differentiated output follows its
own stochastic progression along a quality ladder bringing about quality improvements of
existing products. Their main concern is the implications that such innovations have for
the long run rate of growth in the economy. Our focus here is on setting up a framework
which can be used to analyze various intellectual property rights regimes while shedding
light on the welfare properties of innovation.
One industry that follows the pattern of non-drastic innovation (as quality improve-
ments) with differentiated products is agricultural biotechnology. Innovation in this indus-
try involves the creation of new plant varieties with specific traits using existing plants and
genetic code as the building blocks. In this sense agricultural biotechnology innovations are
cumulative. However, different farms with different weather and soil concerns demand seed
with different traits. In a region where water is scarce, a seed with a drought resistant trait
1See Chang (1995), Green and Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue et al. (1998), and
Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001).
is highly desirable while in regions with no water shortages resistance to herbicides and
pesticides (roundup readiness) is more highly valued. Given that a farm’s needs are best
suited by a specific trait, seed producing companies can focus research efforts on producing
seed targeted for a specific trait with innovations bringing about increases in yield (quality).
When an innovation takes place that improves the yield of a specific trait, that seed may
garner a larger portion of the total market share but it is unlikely that the innovation is
of high enough magnitude that no farm wishes to buy a seed variety with the unimproved
trait.2 The innovation is non-drastic.
Although firm quality levels are truly the endogenous result of stochastic innovation
through time, the purpose of this paper is to buid a framework for and analyze welfare
effects of innovation taking it as exogenous.3 This allows a focus on the trade-off between
quality and firm pricing decisions. A firm with improved quality may increase the price of
its product which could result in lower agent utility. This is especially true if the innovating
firm is already technologically advantaged (at a higher rung on her quality ladder). If the
technologically disadvantaged firm innovates this can cause increased competition in the
product market and may lead to an increase in agent welfare at the expense of reduced
firm profitability.
We model innovation as two firms move along their own respective quality ladder with
each firm selling a product characterized by product differentiation. Our underlying model
of the product market pulls features from both Malla and Gray (2005) and Tanger˚as (2009)
following the tradition of Hotelling (1929). We derive profit functions for two firms in the
presence of non-drastic innovation demonstrating that profit depends only on the tech-
nological gap between firms. We then compute comparative statics demonstrating that
innovation increases consumer utility, firm profits, and welfare as a whole regardless of
the identity of the innovating firm (technologically advantaged or disadvantaged). Welfare
increases by the largest magnitude when both firms innovate.
Section 2 presents our framework for innovation and section 3 derives the welfare effects
of innovation. Section 4 contains the conclusion.
2 A Framework for Innovation
Two firms produce differentiated products which they sell either directly to consumers or
to other producers as intermediate goods. Firms, indexed by i and j, produce and sell their
product with quality of yi ∈ R+. Each firm simultaneously chooses the price for its product
so as to maximize profits in a one stage game. Exogenous to the model, each firm may
innovate as firm product quality experiences a discrete jump along that individual firms’
quality ladder where each rung on the quality ladder for both firms are distance Γ > 0
apart.4
2This is exactly the type of innovation described by Malla and Gray (2005).
3For a detailed analyis of the endogenous choice of quality each firm faces and its relationship to the
intellectual property regime, please see Jackson and Smith (2014).
4Innovation is exogenously treated in Kamien and Tauman (1986), Wang (1998), and Wang (2002).
This is tantamount to treating R&D expenditures as an exogenous cost of conducting business.
There are a continuum of agents, with measure one, uniformly distributed over the
unit interval. These agents could be consumers purchasing a final good such as cell phone
services or firms purchasing an intermediate good to be used in the production of another
good to be sold in the marketplace such as a farmer purchasing seed. The location of the
agent identifies their preference for a specific trait in the product they purchase. Each agent
demands at most one unit and each firm is situated at one end of the interval, i = 0, 1.
Let wi be the price firm i charges for its product and τ > 0 be the marginal loss an agent
bears from buying a product not at their most preferred location. Thus, an agent located
at Ψ ∈ [0, 1] gets a payoff of y0 − τΨ − w0 when she buys the product of firm 0 and
y1 − τ(1−Ψ)− w1 when she buys by the product of firm 1.
We can identify the agent who is indifferent between buying from each firm and identify
her location as Ψ∗. Because each agent buys at most one unit, demand for firm zero’s
product is
Ψ0 = Ψ∗ =
(y0 − y1) + (w1 − w0) + τ
2τ
and demand for firm one’s product is
Ψ1 = 1−Ψ∗ =
(y1 − y0) + (w0 − w1) + τ
2τ
.
Let T be a parameter that represents the marginal cost of marketing and reproducing
a firm’s product. Firms compete in a simultaneous move price setting game. Each firm
sets its own price according to its best response as derived from the following maximization
problem
max
wi
(
wi − T
)
Ψi.
which results in the following best response function
wi(wj) =
(yi − yj) + wj + τ + T
2
.
The Nash equilibrium prices are then
wi∗ =
(yi − yj)
3
+ τ + T.
These can then be used to identify the location of the indifferent agent, Ψ∗, as
Ψ∗ =
(yi − yj)
6τ
+
1
2
.
Throughout our analysis we maintain three assumptions regarding the product market.
Assumption 2.1 guarantees that the entire market is served by one of the two firms.
Assumption 2.1. y
0+y1
2
> τ + T + 1
2
Assumption 2.2 guarantees that each firm has positive demand restricting our analysis
to non-monopoly environments.
Assumption 2.2. | yi − yj |< 3τ
Together, assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 guarantee that the two firms are actively competing
against one another in the product market. This allows us to describe the profit made by
each firm as it depends on the technological gap to be
πi(yi, yj) =
(yi − yj)2 + 6τ(yi − yj) + 9τ 2
18τ
.
In this paper we restrict the magnitude of innovation to be non-drastic. Innovation is
of a small enough magnitude so that firms continue to compete even after an innovation
occurs. Innovation is not large enough to allow one firm to drive the other out of the
market. This is captured in assumption 2.3. If this assumption is violated the market will
be dominated by one firm after the technological leader successfully innovates leaving us
squarely in the realm of the previous quality ladder literature with monopoly switching.
Assumption 2.3. Γ < 3τ− | yi − yj |
Equilibrium payoffs in the product market do not depend on the exact quality of each
firms output; equilibrium payoffs depend only on the difference in quality across the two
firms. Let k be the quality differential defined as k = (y0 − y1). If k > 0 (k < 0) then
firm 0 is said to be technologically advantaged (disadvantaged) and firm 1 is technologically
disadvantaged (advantaged). With this notation product market strategies and equilibrium
payoffs depend only on the variable k allowing the profit equations to be rewritten as follows.
π0(k) =
k2 + 6τk + 9τ 2
18τ
(1)
and
π1(k) =
k2 − 6τk + 9τ 2
18τ
. (2)
Innovation determines y0 and y1 which in turn determines k = y0 − y1. This frame-
work sets up the possibility of analyzing various intellectual property rights regimes in the
context of a markovian game with only one state variable, k. The movement of k across
time could depend on R&D investment and equilibrium patterns of shared (licensed) intel-
lectual property5. Jackson and Smith (2014) use the framework of non-drastic innovation
developed here to analyze the pricing and purchase decisions of experimental use licenses
with innovation being an endogenous product of shared intellectual property.
5Setting up a full markovian game would require consideration of drastic innovation as well. Even if
the game starts where an innovation won’t lead to monopolization, it is possible that over time one firm
could garner a sufficient technological advantage to drive the other out of the market. We contend that
this would take a long time.
3 The Welfare Effects of Innovation
The model of agents and firms as they interact in the product market set forth in the
previous section allows us to explore the welfare effects of innovation and answer such
questions as: Does innovation by one firm increase welfare or decrease welfare and does
it matter if the innovating firm is the technological leader or follower? We answer these
questions by conducting comparative static analysis on innovation. Such analysis is not
trivial as innovation by one firm necessarily impacts not only the profits of both firms
but also the prices paid by consumers. As R&D expenditures are external to the model
developed here, they are not pertinent to welfare analysis. That R&D takes place generates
a given fixed cost of market participation.
We begin the analysis by first focusing on agents (consumers) in the product market.
To simplify matters we split agents into two groups. Those who buy from firm 0 and those
who buy from firm 1. Total agent welfare is the total payoff for each agent group. We
let TU0 be the total payoff to agents purchasing from firm 0 and TU1 be the total payoff
to agents purchasing from firm 1 so that the total payoff to all agents can be written as
TU = TU0 + TU1. Equation (3) for TU given below is derived in the appendix.
TU(y0, y1) =
(
2y1
3
+
y0
3
− T −
3τ
2
)
+
(
(y0 − y1)
3
)(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)
(3)
As equilibrium product prices depend on the quality gap, which depend on innovation,
the effect of innovation on total agent welfare isn’t obvious. When only one firm innovates
the agents who purchase the innovated product will pay a higher price but will ultimately
receive a higher quality product. Proposition (1) demonstrates that total agent welfare as
given in equation (3) increases when a technological innovation is made by either the tech-
nologically advantaged firm or the technologically disadvantaged firm. All of the benefits
of innovation do not end up residing solely in profits to the innovating firm.
Proposition 1. Agent welfare always increases when either firm innovates.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now consider the effects of innovation on firm profits. When only one firm innovates
that firm is able to increase its market power resulting in a higher product price and profits.
The following lemma demonstrates that an innovation by one firm is always profitable for
the innovating firm.
Lemma 1. When one firm innovates, profits for the innovating firm increase.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now combine firm profits and total agent payoffs to get a measure of total welfare
in the product market. It is straightforward to show that
π0(k) + π1(k) =
(y0 − y1)
2
9τ
+ τ.
Therefore, total welfare, TW = TU + π0(k) + π1(k), can be written as
TW =
(
2y1
3
+
y0
3
− T −
τ
2
)
+
(
(y0 − y1)
3
)(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)
+
(y0 − y1)
2
9τ
Intuition suggests that if an innovation is both profitable and increases agent welfare
it should also have a positive impact on total welfare in the economy. The only way this
could not be true would be if the non-innovating firm suffered a decrease in profits greater
than the gains to the innovator and agents. That total welfare increases is demonstrated
in proposition (2).
Proposition 2. Total welfare increases when either the technologically advantaged or tech-
nologically disadvantaged firm innovates.
Proof. See Appendix.
Likewise, if an innovation by one firm increases profits and agent welfare then it is
also likely to be the case that total welfare increases whenever both firms simultaneously
innovate. Such an innovation produces no change in the technological advantage of either
firm6 but does increase the quality of all of the products purchased by agents. Proposition
(3) establishes that a simultaneous innovation by both firms will increase welfare. All
potential profits from the innovation are competed away and the benefits of simultaneous
innovation accrue exclusively to agents as they purchase a higher quality product at the
same price.
Proposition 3. Total welfare increases when both the technologically advantaged and dis-
advantaged firms simultaneously innovate.
Proof. See Appendix.
A final pertinent question that needs to be answered is whether total welfare increases
more when innovation happens one firm at a time or when both firms innovate simulta-
neously. Proposition 4 provides proof that total welfare increases more when both firms
simultaneously innovate than when only one firm innovates. Innovation by one firm only
creates a profit opportunity in which the innovating firm captures some of the new found
surplus generated for consumers and steals some of the other firms market share. Likewise,
innovation by one firm only increases the quality of product consumed by a subset of the
agents. However, when both firms innovate simultaneously there is no competitive edge
gained or increase/decrease in profits for either firm and all agents enjoy an increase in
product quality with no increase in price paid.
Proposition 4. Welfare increases by a larger magnitude when both firms innovate rather
than innovation by only one firm.
6Both firms advance to the next rung on their respective quality ladder producing no change in differ-
ential quality.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we derived a model of duopoly competition in the presence of product dif-
ferentiation. Previous literature on non-drastic innovation did not model consumers nor
derive demand in the product market. We derived our model from primitives on consumer
preferences which allow us to analyze the welfare effects of non-drastic innovation. We
show that non-drastic innovation always produces an increase in total welfare but welfare
increases are the largest when both firms simultaneously innovate. This can have policy
implications for the construction of intellectual property rights surrounding innovation. An
intellectual property rights regime that encourages the sharing of intellectual property in
R&D, such as one granting an experimental use exemption, may welfare dominate a regime
with licensing requirements.
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A Welfare Proofs
Proof. Proof of Proposition 1
Calculate the partial derivatives of TU(y0, y1) as
∂TU
∂y0
=
1
2
+
(y0 − y1)
9τ
∂TU
∂y1
=
1
2
−
(y0 − y1)
9τ
.
If y0 > y1 then ∂TU
∂y0
> 0. If y0 < y1 then ∂TU
∂y1
> 0. So that agent welfare increases when
the leader innovates.
Let yi > yj. Then ∂TU
∂yj
> 0 if yj−yi > −9τ
2
which can be rewritten as | yj−yi |< 9τ
2
which
is true by assumption 2.2. Thus welfare always increases when the follower innovates.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1
Inspection of the functional form of π0(k) and π1(k) reveal that they are each a parabolic
in shape with a minimum occurring at k = −3τ and k = 3τ , respectively. Each firm’s
profits are the smallest when they are technologically behind by a magnitude of 3τ . The
assumption 2.2 guarantees that an innovation will increase profits.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose y0 > y1.
∂TW
∂y0
=
1
2
+
2(y0 − y1)
18τ
+
2(y0 − y1)
9τ
=
1
2
+
(y0 − y1)
6τ
∂TW
∂y1
=
1
2
−
2(y0 − y1)
18τ
−
2(y0 − y1)
9τ
=
1
2
−
(y0 − y1)
6τ
Since y0 > y1 then ∂TW
∂y0
> 0. Combined with assumption 2.2 we also have ∂TW
∂y1
> 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3 From the equation for TW we see that if both y0 and y1
increase by a magnitude of Γ due to a simultaneous innovation by both firms. Then total
welfare increases by the size of the innovation, Γ > 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4
Since both partial derivatives of total welfare are positive but less than one, as a result
of assumption 2.2, the welfare increase when both firms innovate, Γ > 0, is larger.
Γ > Γ
∂TW
∂yi
A.1 Derivation of Equation 3
TU = TU0 + TU1. Each of these pieces can be computed as an integral.
TU0 =
∫
Ψ∗
0
(
y0 − τΨ0 − w0
)
dΨ0
Substituting for equilibrium price w0∗ from above we get
TU0 =
∫
Ψ∗
0
(
y0 − τΨ0 −
y0 − y1
3
− τ − T
)
dΨ0.
We then compute the integral to get
TU0 =
[(
y0 −
(y0 − y1)
3
− τ − T
)
Ψ0 −
τΨ0
2
2
]∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ0=Ψ∗
Ψ0=0
which reduces to
TU0 =
(
y0 −
(y0 − y1)
3
− τ − T
)
Ψ∗ −
τΨ∗2
2
.
Then substitute Ψ∗ and rearrange terms to get
TU0 =
(
2y0
3
+
y1
3
− τ − T
)(
(y0 − y1
6τ
+
1
2
)
−
τ
2
(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)2
Likewise
TU1 =
∫
1
Ψ∗
(
y1 − τΨ1 − w1
)
dΨ1
Substituting for equilibrium price w1∗ from above we get
TU1 =
∫
1
Ψ∗
(
y1 − τΨ1 −
y1 − y0
3
− τ − T
)
dΨ1.
We then compute the integral to get
TU1 =
[(
y1 −
(y1 − y0)
3
− τ − T
)
Ψ1 −
τΨ1
2
2
]∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ1=1
Ψ1=Ψ∗
which reduces to
TU1 =
(
y1 −
(y1 − y0)
3
− τ − T −
τ
2
)
−
(
y1 −
(y1 − y0)
3
− τ − T
)
Ψ∗ +
τΨ∗2
2
.
Then substitute Ψ∗ and rearrange terms to get
TU1 =
(
2y1
3
+
y0
3
− T −
3τ
2
)
−
(
2y1
3
+
y0
3
− τ − T
)(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)
+
τ
2
(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)2
These can be combined to give an expression for the total payoff to all agents in the
market as
TU(y0, y1) =
(
2y1
3
+
y0
3
− T −
3τ
2
)
+
(
(y0 − y1)
3
)(
(y0 − y1)
6τ
+
1
2
)
.
